A Price-Level (Incentive) Regulation Proposal for Oil Pipelines by Whittaker, Win
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 46 Number 3 
1-1-1993 
A Price-Level (Incentive) Regulation Proposal for Oil Pipelines 
Win Whittaker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Win Whittaker, A Price-Level (Incentive) Regulation Proposal for Oil Pipelines, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 415 (1993), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
A PRICE-LEVEL (INCENTIVE) REGULATION
PROPOSAL FOR OIL PIPELINES
WIN WHITTAKER*
Introduction
The U.S. Department of Justice concluded in a 1986 report (the DOJ Deregulation
Report) that all crude oil pipelines and all but a handful of product oil pipelines are
subject to meaningful competition.' Based on that conclusion, the Justice Department
recommended deregulation of oil pipelines lacking "market power. ' Although
deregulation bills were introduced in subsequent sessions of Congress, they never saw
the legislative light of day? Instead, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992,4 Congress
passed the buck back to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the
Commission), which regulates interstate oil pipelines Section 1801(a) of the 1992
Act provides: "Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall issue a final rule which establishes a
simplified and generally applicable ratemaking methodology for oil pipelines in
accordance with section 1(5) of part I of the Interstate Commerce Act."6 Section 1(5)
is the Interstate Commerce Act's "just and reasonable rate" provision.7 In the
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1. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OIL PIPELINE DEREGULATION (1986) [hereinafter DOJ DEREGULATION
REPORT].
2. Id. at 61-62.
3. See, e.g., S. 2770, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 CONG. REc. S12,163 (1988) (unenacted); S. 1471,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 3092, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
5. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The Act transferred
regulatory jurisdiction over common carrier oil pipelines from the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) to the newly created FERC. Id. § 402(b), 91 Stat. at 584 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(b) (1988)).
This transfer was effectuated by Exec. Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267 (1977), and implemented
by 42 Fed. Reg. 55,534 (1977)).
6. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 1801(a), 106 Stat. at 3010.
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1(5)(a) (1958). Section 1(5)(a) provides: "All charges made for any service rendered
or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith,
shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part
thereof is prohibited and declared to be unlawful." Id. Congress recodified the Interstate Commerce Act
as 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-11,999 in 1978. Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337
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meantime, two decisions by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission administrative
law judges also suggested that the oil pipeline business is becoming more competi-
tive.'
While Congress was deferring to the FERC, the FERC was deferring to the
pipelines. Then, on October 24, 1992, the Energy Policy Act became law. In a
"Policy Statement On Incentive Regulation" issued on October 30, 1992, the FERC
invited oil pipelines, as well as natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, to propose
their own incentive regulation program. The FERC differentiated between "light-
handed regulation" (a concept the Commission has yet to define, but has said applies
to pipelines that lack market power) and "incentive regulation" (also a concept the
FERC has not defined, but has said is not intended for competitive markets.)"0
Whatever incentive regulation is, it is not traditional cost-of-service regulation which
(according to the FERC and other ratemaking agencies) does not provide the regulated
entity any incentive to hold investments and operating costs to efficient levels."
Thus, incentive regulation is a regulatory regime that induces the regulated entity to
optimize its deployment of capital and operating expenses.
While the FERC cannot lawfully deregulate oil pipelines without statutory authority,
the courts have signalled that ratemaking agencies are not legislatively tethered to
traditional cost-of-service standards in assuring a regulated entity's rates are just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. As the District of Columbia Circuit observed in
Farmers Union Central Exchange Inc. v. FERC," an oil pipeline case, when a
federal ratemaking agency finds that circumstances justify "[m]oving from heavy to
lighthanded regulation," the courts have "sanctioned dramatic reductions in regulatory
oversight."3 Generally, federal agencies and many state agencies are moving away
from traditional ratemaking standards and toward incentive regulation for two reasons.
(1978). However, the rec'dification excluded from the general repeal of prior statutes "those laws [that]
vested functions in the Interstate Commerce Commission... related... to the transportation of oil by
pipeline" and "those functions and authority [that] were transferred [to FERCl by sections 306 and 402(b)
of the Department of Energy Organization Act." Id. sec. 11,916, § 4(c), 92 Stat. at 1470. The prior
statutes therefore still govern FERC's authority over oil pipeline rates.
8. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 50 F.E.R.C. 63,011 (1990) (Initial Decision) (assessing market power
of oil pipeline company); Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,473 (1990) (Final Decision); Buckeye
Pipe Line Co., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,084 (1991) (Rehearing Decision); William Pipe Line Co., 58 F.E.R.C.
61,091, 61,326 (1992) (finding proposed tariff not so unduly complicated as to inhibit competition).
9. Incentive Ratermking for Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, Oil Pipelines, and Electric Utilities,
61 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (1992) [hereinafter Incentive Regulation Policy Statement].
10. Id 61,588 ("The Commission emphasizes that incentive regulation is not intended for
competitive markets. It is intended for markets where the continued existence of market power prevents
the Commission from implementing light-handed regulation without harm to consumers,").
11. Under the traditional cost-of-service approach, the Commission determines the regulated entity's
cost of capital (rate of return) and investment (rate) base. The Commission multiplies the cost of capital
times the investment base and, then, adds the entity's operating expenses to that to arrive at a revenue
requirement. Rates are then adjusted to yield the revenue requirement. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911
F.2d 776, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. 734 F.2d 1486 ().C. Cir. 1984).
13. Id. at 1510.
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First, the failure of traditional cost-of-service regulation to achieve its primary
objective - the replication of competitive results in terms of return levels, resource
utilization, and efficiencies - is dramatic and well documented. As Professor (now
Judge) Breyer observed: "[T]he regulatory process - even when it functions perfectly
- cannot reproduce the price signals that a workable competitive marketplace would
provide."'14 Thus, Breyer concluded, "only serious market failure will, even arguably,
warrant the adoption of cost-of-service ratemaking .... ."
Second, incentive regulation can minimize or eliminate the perverse economic
incentives inherent in cost-of-service regulation and, at the same time, provide
reasonable assurance that the pipeline's rates are just and reasonable. This is true even
where market power exists. The Federal Communications Commission found the
incentives inherent in cost-of-service regulation so perverse and the potential benefits
of incentive regulation (which it called "price caps") so great that it imposed price cap
regulation on AT&T when it controlled over 70% of the long distance market 6 and
on local telephone companies even though they possessed market power. 7
The FERC has adopted a "policy" of light-handed regulation for oil pipelines
lacking significant market power. 8 However, the Commission has yet to define what
is meant by light-handed and incentive regulation on a case-by-case basis. 9 This is
a daunting task given that over one hundred oil pipelines are subject to the FERC's
regulatory authority.?
This article outlines a proposal to ease the Commission's task without forsaking the
statutory goal of just and reasonable rates. The efficacy of the proposed regulatory
regime does not depend on whether particular pipelines lack significant market power
- the FERC's present one-dimensional qualification for light-handed regulation.!'
That standard is far too static, limited, and costly.' A more dynamic standard
14. STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND rrs REFORM 58-59 (1982).
15. Id.
16. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C. Record 2873, 2937-43
(1989). The policy was reconsidered in 1991. 6 F.C.C. Record 665 (1991).
17. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 F.C.C. Record 6796, 6837-38
(1990). The policy was reconsidered in 1991. 6 F.C.C. Record 2637 (1991), affd sub nom. National
Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
18. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 44 F.E.R.C. H 61,066, 61,186 (1988), reh'g denied, 45 F.E.R.C.
61,046 (1988).
19. See Incentive Regulation Policy Statement, supra note 9, 61,589.
20. See Oil Pipeline Deregulation Hearing on Title IV, Subtitle D, of H.R. 1155 and H.R. 2734,
Subcomm. on Energy and Power, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 192
(1988) (stating that the Association of Oil Pipelines reported there were "over 138" oil pipelines in
service).
21. See Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,473, 62,662-62,663 (1990) (Final Decision)
(explaining that significant market power requires close regulatory oversight, whereas lack of market
power requires light-handed regulation).
22. FERC evaluates market power on a pipeline-by-pipeline, area-by-area basis. Buckeye Pipeline
reportedly spent $5,000,000 and five years to convince the FERC it was entitled to light-handed
regulation. See Lynn Garner, Oil Pipeline Deregulation Faces Batters, OIL DAILY, June 14, 1991, at 1.
1993]
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determines what regulatory structure will maximize consumer surplus' and best
promotes the efficient utilization of resources; in other words, determines whether
cost-of-service regulation or light-handed regulation will yield the greater net benefit
to society.
The Commission's current regulatory scheme is both an anchor and an anachronism
in the current environment. This scheme inhibits pricing that maximizes consumer
surplus and creates economically irrational investment incentives that burden both
pipelines and consumers. Moreover, the notion that artificially restraining pipeline
rates through regulation will result in consumers paying less for gasoline at the pump
is quixotic.' The market price of refined petroleum products is virtually unaffected
by variations in pileline rates.' Thus, artificially restrained pipeline rates result in
windfalls to processors or distributors, with consumers still paying the market price
for refined petroleum products.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I examines cost-of-service regulation
from the perspective of economic incentives and regulatory goals. This examination
reveals that cost-of-service (profit-level) regulation has created and continues to create
an array of incorrect economic signals resulting in significant, inefficient utilization
of resources. These distortions are so great that discarding cost-of-service regulation
across the board is warranted even if the FERC finds that particular pipelines possess
market power in individual markets. Indeed, light-handed regulation is a modest step
in light of the DOJ Deregulation Report.
Part II examines the relevant economic and legal considerations in evaluating price-
level regulation as a substitute for cost-of-service (profit-level) regulation. The
economic evaluation shows that price-level regulation creates unambiguous incentives
to minimize costs and to price services in an economically rational manner. The legal
evaluation shows that the Commission possesses the authority to substitute price-level
regulation for cost-of-service regulation. Specifically, the Commission can adopt a
price-level regulation scheme which gives pipelines the incentive to transition to
market-level rates.
Part III outlines a price-level regulatory regime designed to achieve market-based
rates and, at the same time protect against possible monopoly pricing in any insular
pockets where competition alone might not discipline price adjustments. The proposed
plan is structured to capture the benefits of competitive pricing and provide a series
of constraints that safeguard shippers against "unjust and unreasonable" rates. The
proposed plan, if adopted, would reduce the need for the massive bureaucracy which
exists today at the agency level and within the individual pipeline companies to
accommodate regulation.
23. Consumer surplus is the difference between the price that consumers actually paid for a
service/product and what they would have been willing to pay. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 278 (4th ed. 1992).
24. See Alan Reynolds, A Free Market in Energy, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 67, 74 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1982).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See supra note I.
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Part IV discusses several procedural matters relating to implementing price-level
regulation. The principal conclusion is that a pipeline's existing rates should be its
initial price-level rates. This part also discusses the standards for assessing whether
a rate complaint by a shipper states a cause of action under price-level regulation.
I. Cost-of-Service (Profit-Level) Regulation of Pipelines in Perspective
The common carrier concept evolved out of a societal need to regulate essential
services provided by a business uniquely "affected with a public interest."' Although
monopoly power was not initially the touchstone justifying rate regulation, 9 the
common carrier concept evolved legislatively to include companies imbued with the
public interest that exhibit significant economies of scale. Railroads, pipelines, electric
companies, and telephone companies have high capital investment to variable cost
ratios, thus indicating the existence of significant scale economies.
The twin attributes of capital-intensity and significant scale economies meant that,
absent governmental intervention, only one firm in the market would survive. The
largest firm had the lowest cost per unit and the incentive to produce the total output
demanded by consumers. The fear was not of monopoly per se - sole source
provision of the service would be most efficient from a cost-per-unit perspective and,
thus, would allow for the largest consumer surplus. Rather, the fear was that the
surviving firm would restrict output in order to increase profits. As a result, resources
would be misallocated as the demand of all buyers willing to pay the marginal cost
of the service was not satisfied.
The nation's regulatory statutes thus were designed to preclude carriers from
restricting output to capture monopoly profits. The objective was to replicate
competitive results in terms of prices, resource utilization, and efficiencies." As
28. LORD HALE, DE PORTIBUs MARLs 78 (Hargrave Law Tracts No. 1, 1776) (written prior to 1676),
quoted in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-16 (1876).
29. At common law, the basis for classification of an entity as a "common carrier" was whether a
particular service was sufficiently "affected with a public interest as to justify ... regulation of its rates."
Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARv. L. REv. 135, 144 (1915) (citation omitted); Martin
T. Farris, The Case Against Deregulation in Transportation, Power, and Communications, 45 ICC PRAc.
J. 306, 307-12, 317 (1978). As Farris points out: "Innkeepers, millers, bakers, hackmen, etc., were not
monopolies nor were they to be regulated because of their economic form. Rather, their services were
essential to society - and that was the cause of their regulation." Id. at 311; see also Adler, supra, at
148-49.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the seminal decision in this country, did not establish monopoly
power as the basis for regulation. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions "denuded" Munn of the "limiting
element" (namely, "to justify regulation of a business the business must have a monopolistic character.")
which lower courts and various commissions had read into the Munn decision. German Alliance Ins. Co.
v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 410 (1914); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534 (1934) (observing
that monopolistic characteristics are not sole factor in decision to regulate); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S.
517 (1892).
30. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'N OF R.R. & UTILS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL
CONVENTION 369 (1942) (from the report of the Committee on the Progress in Public Utility Regulation)
("The purpose of [rate of return regulation) ... is to stimulate and substitute the effects of competition
and give the consumer the benefits which would be derived from a system of competition.").
1993]
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Judge Leventhal observed, "rate regulation... is intended to achieve the results which
under 'normal' conditions would have been available with free, fair and normal
competition."'" In that sense, the regulatory statutes parallel the objective of the
antitrust laws: "[T]he basic goal of direct governmental regulation through administra-
tive bodies and the goal of indirect governmental regulation in the form of antitrust
law is the same - to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible."32
Recent studies illastrate how traditional cost-of-service regulation has failed those
objectives by a wide margin?3 The documented deficiencies of cost-of-service
regulation fall into three broad categories:
Perverse Investmant Incentives: Competition creates the incentive for an entity to
reduce costs. In contrast, cost-of-service regulation can create the incentive to inflate
investment costs (the Averch-Johnson effect -6 ) and offers little penalty for excessive
operating cost levels (the X-Inefficiency effect 35). Under cost-of-service regulation,
the carrier can increase dollar earnings by increasing its investment base and increase
its revenues by increasing its total costs. Moreover, cost-of-service regulation fails to
reward a carrier for providing service more efficiently as it fails to distinguish between
earnings attributable to improved utilization of resources and those attributable to the
exercise of monopoly power. As Professor Kahn pointed out:
Th[e] negative character of a regulatory process that concentrates mainly
on the rate of return on aggregate company investment entails several
inadequacies or adverse consequences. It means that regulation as such
contains no built-in mechanism for assuring efficiency.... [I]t tends to
take away any supernormal returns [the companies] might earn as a result
of improvements in efficiency, thereby diminishing their incentive to try.
And if it permits them to earn only the cost of capital, it creates a
situation in which any inefficiencies can simply be passed on in higher
rates without injury to existing stockholders. Indeed, it creates strong
incentives on the part of the companies to pad their expenses ....
31. Harold Leventhl, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in
a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989, 990 (1965) (citations omitted).
32. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C.Cir. 1968)).
33. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 14; JORDAN J. HILLMAN & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE
LEVEL REGULATION Foy: DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILrTEs: AN ASSESSMENT (1989) [hereinafter PRICE
LEVEL REGULATION]; Jchn R. Meyer & William B. Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in
Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 273 (1988).
34. See Harvey Avwrch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). According to Averch & Johnson, carriers have an incentive to adopt
inefficient, capital intensive approaches to business operations when the allowed rate of return exceeds
the cost of capital and to adopt inefficient labor intensive approaches when the cost of capital exceeds
the allowed rate of return. Id. at 1054.
35. See Harvey Leiterstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966).
36. 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 48 (1971); see also THOMAS K.
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 13 (1984) (stating that one problem with the 10% profit limitation
was that "[i]f a corporation earns a 10 percent rate of return on its capital by doing a certain amount of
[Vol. 46:415
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Inefficient Pricing Incentives: Economics teaches that consumer surplus is
maximized by pricing services on a marginal cost basis. Cost-of-service regulation
typically sets prices based on average total costs which only in the rarest of
happenstances equal marginal costs. (If average costs are greater than marginal costs,
as is true for pipelines, and prices are set to equal marginal costs, the firm will be
unable to recover its costs without a subsidy. Furthermore, as most pipelines are
multiproduct firms, average costs are not definable in any economically rational
way.)37 Those parenthetical points aside, even the average total costs developed by
regulators are generally distorted and bear little relationship to a carrier's actual
average costs. For example, depreciation rates historically have only weakly reflected
the true economic lifetimes of the carrier's assets and, therefore, have created
enormous distortions in both expenses and rate bases used to "calculate" average
costs 8 In addition, the time delays built into the regulatory process inhibit adjusting
prices as relevant costs change.
Inefficient Deployment of Resources: Regulation itself imposes enormous costs -
costs which the Department of Justice concluded far outweigh the perceived societal
benefits attributable to cost-of-service regulation.39 The costs of regulation are both
direct (commission and commission staff, plus the "outside" lawyers, accountants,
engineers, and economists employed by both the pipelines and protestors) and indirect
(the losses occasioned by perverse incentives and economically inefficient pricing).
A. Perverse Economic Incentives
The strength claimed for cost-of-service regulation is also its Achilles' heel. Up
front profit constraints, expressed as a percentage of earnings allowed on investment,
do not deter the carrier from increasing its absolute earnings by increasing investment.
In fact, a regulatory commission cannot induce the proper investment incentives
regardless of whether it sets the carrier's return at, above, or below the carrier's cost
of capital.' If the Commission persistently allows a return in excess of the pipeline's
cost of capital, the carrier will be tempted to over-invest, thereby increasing profits
without seeking an increase in the rate of return. This is the so-called Averch-Johnson
effect.4' In addition, the carrier has an unchecked incentive to choose an inefficiently
high ratio of capital to labor.
work, then it has no incentive to do more than this certain amount, or to do even that same work with
greater efficiency").
37. See discussion infra part II.B.
38. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities,
4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6-7 (1986).
39. See DOJ DEREGULATION REPORT, supra note 1.
40. Quantifications of the inefficiencies established by cost-of-service regulation have been made
of monopoly electric utilities subject to cost-of-service regulation in relation to such utilities in situations
in which some competitive forces exist. Holding other factors constant, one such study found a unit cost
differential of approximately 11%. See Walter J. Primeaux, Note, An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained
Through Competition, 59 REv. ECON. & STAT. 105, 107 (1977).
41. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 34.
19931
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On the other hand, if the Commission sets the return below the cost of capital, the
carrier is discouraged from making necessary capital improvements and additions
which, in turn, jeopardizes the quality of service' As the Third Circuit pointed out:
"Railroad management has little incentive to reinvest [internally generated] funds...
in continued rail use if greater returns are available elsewhere.... [R]etained earnings
will not be invested in the company if they cannot earn a rate of return equal to the
cost of capital."'43 As a result, the pipeline will choose an inefficiently low ratio of
capital to labor, thereby causing the rates charged for service to be unnecessarily high
over the long run.
Even if the Corrmission manages to set and maintain the rate of return at the
pipeline's cost of capital, the pipeline's incentive to reduce or hold down costs is
ambiguous at best.4 The ceiling on profits and effective indifference to costs make
the pipeline ambivflent about reducing costs and adopting innovations since the
benefits will flow through to the ratepayer.45
To be sure, the Commission has the authority to disallow inflated investments and
imprudently incurred costs.' But, as a practical matter, the Commission cannot
prevent rate padding by micromanaging the business operations of every pipeline that
it regulates 7 A pipeline's costs largely result from numerous, discrete decisions made
daily by hundreds of company employees. Even if adequate personnel were available,
the Commission would need to know as much as the pipeline knows about costs,
demand conditions, and marketing and product opportunities in order to evaluate their
42. See ANDREW S. CARRON & PAUL W. MACAvoY, THE DECLINE OF SERVICE IN THE REGULATED
INDUSTRIES (1981). A prime example is the railroad industry, which literally stopped investing and
improving facilities when cost-of-service regulation persistently resulted in returns that were less than
the opportunity cost of capital. Specifically, railroad management had no incentive to reinvest retained
earnings in the regulated portion of their business. See e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
TRANsMrrrED TO THE CONGRESS 1986, at 163-64 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1986); Thomas Gale
Moore, Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED
MARKETS 56, 56-72 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975) (discussing costs to economy from regulation of surface
freight and transportation).
43. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. v. ICC, 691 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1110 (1983) (quoting Standards for Railroad Revenue Adequacy (Exparte No. 393), 364 I.C.C. 803, 810
(1981)).
44. See, e.g., Jordan Jay Hillman & Ronald R. Braeutigam, The Potential Benefits and Problems
of Price Level Regulation: A More Hopeful Perspective, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 695,696 (1990) [hereinafter
Hillman & Braeutigam, Hopeful Perspective] ("Beyond indifference, managers may be encouraged to
seek the maximum feasible personal rewards to be derived from added expenditures - whether in the
form of direct monetary benefits, enhanced public status, or a less ruffled managerial life.").
45. Regulatory lag (foes provide some incentive at cost control as prices remain fixed between rate
cases. But, the profits ate only maintained between rate cases, thus the incentive is weak. Cf. Joskow
& Schmalensee, supra note 38, at 14 ("Regulatory lag partly decouples prices from costs and permits
utilities to increase profi~s by reducing costs in the period prior to rate adjustments.").
46. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63,74 (1935); Mississippi River Fuel
Corp. v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d
1021, 1029-33 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
47. See Joskow & Schmaensee, supra note 38, at 12-13.
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business operations effectively.! Given current budget constraints, the Commission
cannot hope to attain even a significant fraction of such knowledge.
B. Economically Dysfunctional Pricing Structures
A natural tension exists between traditional cost-of-service regulation and
competition, because cost-of-service regulation typically precludes "competitive
pricing." Indeed, Judge Posner suggests that the primary motivation behind cost-of-
service regulation is the maintenance of cross-subsidy flows without regard for
efficient pricing.49
Historically, regulators employing cost-of-service regulation have set prices without
much regard to service-specific costs or have allowed regulated firms to determine
their own rate structures, subject only to an overall rate-of-return constraint. More
recently, however, regulators have used rate-of-return constraints coupled with fully
allocated costs to regulate rate structures.' The fully-allocated-cost procedure is
fundamentally flawed and, as a consequence, results in inefficient rate structures that
impose substantial efficiency losses.5"
Fully allocated costs purport to produce an average cost per unit. But, whenever
joint and common costs are present, the average cost of an individual product cannot
be rationally defined.' Because no rational (i.e., cost-causative) basis exists to
allocate common overhead costs, any allocation of costs is arbitrary by definition.
Whatever the "logic" offered for any allocation scheme, the resulting rate structure will
inevitably depart from an efficient model. Moreover, under cost-of-service
48. Hillman & Braeutigam, Hopeful Perspective, supra note 44, at 696 ("While regulators may
succeed in curtailing the grossest examples of waste, they generally are incapable of developing the
knowledge and skill needed to compel the level of productive efficiency obtainable by competent
managers operating under competitive conditions. Even if they could, the public costs of providing a
second managerial tier would likely prove prohibitive.").
49. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 22 (1971); see also Joskow &
Schmalensee, supra note 38, at 13; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level Regulation Based on Inflation Is
Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 667-68 (1990) ("Price
level regulation also promises to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the present tendency to base regulated
prices on economically irrelevant embedded costs and arbitrarily determined or politically manipulated
allocations of common costs.").
50. See, e.g., Henry E. Kilpatrick, Why Fully Allocated Cost Does Not Die a Natural Death, 124
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 24, 26 (1989) (observing that absent feasible plan to implement Ramsey pricing, full
cost allocation used to avoid monopolistic pricing). Under the fully allocated cost procedure, the
Commission allocates the carrier's costs and assets among its services; an overall rate of return is then
used to estimate the average cost of each individual service. Prices are set equal to these "fully allocated
costs." Id. at 24.
51. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 49, at 667-68, 671.
52. In contrast, marginal cost remains well defined for all multi-product firms. But, as was noted
above, marginal cost cannot be readily employed within the rate of return framework. For an excellent
general discussion of cost concepts for multiproduct firms, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL.,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982), especially chapters 3 and
4.
53. See, e.g., Ronald R. Braeutigam, An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated
Industries, I 1 BELL J. ECON. 182, 194-95 (1980) (describing incentives that fully distributed cost pricing
could have on regulated firm) [hereinafter Braeutigam, Analysis]; Hillman & Braeutigam, Hopeful
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regulation, the canier may have incentives to distort the allocation of costs if
regulatory lag or mistaken estimates of a reasonable rate of return provide profit
opportunities.'
The presence of competition for some, but not all, portions of a pipeline's business
will tend to exacerbate the perverse incentives occasioned by cost-of-service
regulation.' To illustrate: one reason advanced for continuing with cost-of-service
regulation in the presence of competition is the "need" to prevent cross-subsidy and
predatory pricing. Such regulation attempts to deal with these concerns by policing
the allocation of costs to individual tariffed services and by forcing the computed rates
of return on all services toward equality. Neither prong of this reasoning is
sustainable.
First, even in the single service context, the correct economic test for predation
involves marginal (or incremental) cost, not the notion of average cost that fully
allocated costs attempt to measure. And in multi-service (multi-tariff) contexts,
average cost - in addition to being an irrational test for either cross-subsidy or
predation - cannot be defined in an economically meaningful way.'
Second, competition can rapidly affect the true economic lives of assets, further
distorting prices based on outdated depreciation schedules. Thus, fully allocated costs
as a test for cross-su'fsidy and predation may, in some instances, compel cross-subsidy
or predation in soma cases and overprotect in other instances.
In the end, the basic approach of allocating costs and assets to particular products
invites the very behavior that fully-allocated-cost pricing seeks to control. The
presence of competition not only makes it less likely that cost-of-service regulation
will produce efficient rate structures, but it will magnify the losses from inefficient
rate structures. For that reason, most economists recognize the Ramsey pricing
concept, as opposed to fully allocated costs, results in more efficient resource
utilization and greater consumer surplus.'
Perspective, supra note 44, at 697 ("Since there are no economically correct nonmarket standards for
allocating common costs, the conflict is waged through arbitrary allocation formulas contrived to project
some semblance of rationality.").
54. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey, Peak-Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint, 80 J. POL.
ECON. 662 (1972).
55. PRICE LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 10-11 (noting, after identifying inherent
deficiencies of cost of service that "[tihree additional failures of rate of return regulation occur where a
regulated firm serving two markets, one competitive and the other a monopoly, operates under a rate of
return constraint on the combined markets").
56. WutuAM W. SFARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 42 (1982) ("Mhe test for cross-
subsidization reduces to the constraint that revenues must cover incremental costs of production.");
William J. Baumol & Alfred G. Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 YALE
L.J. 639, 641 (1973) (explaining argument of advocates of incremental cost standard); Gerald R.
Faulhaber & Stephen B. Levinson, Subsidy-Free Prices and Anonymous Equity, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
1083, 1090 (1981) ("[Prices which are less than stand-alone cost and greater than incremental costs
[cannot] involve cross-subsidy. Consumers are at least as well off under joint provision as under stand-
alone provision.").
57. Ramsey pricing involves marking up services inversely to elasticities of demand. The more
inelastic a service the more (relatively) common overhead costs that services will bear. See infra part
II.B.
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C. The Negative Economic Benefit of Cost-of-Service Regulation
The direct and indirect costs of traditional cost-of-service regulation are enormous
for both the regulatory agency (and, thus, taxpayers) and the regulated firm (and, thus,
customers).5 The direct costs of regulation include the expert staffs of lawyers,
accountants, engineers, and economists. These direct costs cause a ripple effect
resulting in significant indirect costs.
As Dr. Robert A. Leone pointed out, in his book Who Profits: Winners, Losers and
Government Regulation:
[Tihe "real costs" of regulation go far beyond the consequences of
regulation for the cost of doing business. Rather they include the impacts
on domestic and international competition, the impacts on capacity deci-
sions, and the consequences for long-term industrial strategies. In many
industries that compete on bases other than cost, such as service, variety,
or product reliability, and undue focus on costs can miss much that is
important to competitive impact. Similarly, whatever value benefit/cost
analysis might have as a basis for regulatory decision making, it is
inherently incomplete 9
The DOJ Deregulation Report concluded that the direct and indirect resources
devoted to regulation exceed the tangible and intangible benefits of regulatory oil
pipelines on a cost-of-service basis. But, whatever the dollar cost of regulation, a
highly relevant fact is that such costs" add nothing to final product value and society
would benefit if they were reduced.
II. The Relevant Economic and Legal Considerations
in Possible Price-Level Regulatory Regimes
A general consensus exists that a properly structured price-level regulatory scheme
can eliminate or significantly ameliorate the distortions inherent in cost-of-service
regulation and, at the same time, increase consumer welfare. First, price-level
regulation does not impose any specified restraint on earnings level, thus eliminating
any incentive the pipeline has to deploy resources in an extravagant or inefficient
manner.6 Second, price-level regulation better accommodates rate structures that are
economically efficient, thus maximizing consumer welfare.' Third, price-level
58. See BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2-9 (1978).
59. ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITS: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 211-12
(1986).
60. See DOJ DEREGULATION REPORT, supra note 1, at x-xi.
61. See PRICE LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 37-43 ("By breaking the equation between the
firm's actual internal costs and allowed revenues, price level regulation regenerates the entire range of
managerial incentives for profit maximization - subject, of course, to the constraint of maximum price
levels.").
62. See Pierce, supra note 49, at 667-68.
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regulation requires less manpower to regulate, thus dramatically decreasing the high
administrative costs inherent in cost-of-service regulation.63
The price-level regulatory regime can achieve these objectives without violating the
requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. The courts recognize that the
Commission has wide discretion in assuring that rates comport with the Act's 'just and
reasonable rate" standard.'
A. Price-Level Regulation Gives Pipelines an Unambiguous Incentive
To Minimize Costs
Price-level regulation is directed at what shippers care about, namely, price. It is
price, not the pipeiine's rate of return, that directly affects the economic welfare of
shippers. A shipper would rather pay $1.00 and have the pipeline earn a 15% return,
than to pay $1.25 and limit the pipeline to a 10% return. Cost-of-service regulation
is aimed at limiting the pipeline to the 10% return even though the result is a $1.25
rate. That is because profit-level regulation provides no incentives for the pipeline to
hold down costs.
As price-level regulation would eliminate the Commission's official interest in the
pipeline's costs, it would give the pipeline an unambiguous incentive to minimize its
costs, both statically and dynamically (i.e., introducing cost-saving techniques), since
every cost reducticn generates an additional profit.65 There is a risk to the pipeline
in pursuing that additional profit - investments aimed at reducing costs or generating
additional revenues may prove unsuccessful. Under price-level regulation the resulting
losses are borne by the pipeline and not the consumer, just as the pipeline would
receive the benefit of successful investments. From the regulator's perspective, price-
level regulation eliminates the near-impossible (but, in any event, time-consuming)
task of second guessing a pipeline's investment and operating cost decisions - tasks
inherent in cost-of-service regulation.
Unlike cost-of-service regulation, price-level regulation does not conflict with the
fundamental consumer welfare-enhancing motivations created by competitive forces.
Stated differently, the economic basis for a pipeline's decisions under incentive
regulation is precisely the same as for a fully competitive firm. Once incentive
regulation is introduced, more and more efficiencies will gradually be introduced into
a pipeline's operations, thereby lowering the pipeline's overall costs. The decrease in
costs represents a net benefit to the nation's economy, since the same output is being
produced at less cost. Accordingly, incentive regulation, right from the start, would
63. See PRIcE LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 65-66.
64. See infra part II.C.
65. To the extent regulatory lag exists in a cost-of-service regime, cost reductions generate
temporary profit increa;es for carriers. However, the elevated return will generally cause the regulator
to take steps to reduce prices to lower the carrier's return level. The classical economist would point out
that this mirrors what happens in competitive markets: The innovative firm makes an "above normal"
profit until the firm's competitors implement the same cost-saving innovations. Thus, the classical
economist would argue that regulatory lag permits the same short-term, elevated profit level that exists
in competitive markets.
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sharply reduce the tendency of carriers to engage in the types of behavior labelled as
the Averch-Johnson effect and the X-Inefficiency effect.
Obviously, then, if price-level regulation is to constitute true regulatory reform, it
must allow prices to adapt to market influences and create incentives and opportunities
to behave in an economically efficient manner. Ultimately, shippers will benefit in the
form of prices that are lower and economically rational.
B. Price-Level Regulation Can Promote Economically Efficient Rate Structures
and, Concurrently, Assure That Rates Satisfy the Just and Reasonable Standard
In theory, competition tends to drive prices to marginal costs. In the regulatory
context, marginal cost pricing requires those ratepayers which impose the costs on the
system to bear those costs. The result is price signals that tend to discourage
inefficient use of resources. In other words, an economically efficient rate structure
influences ratepayers to adjust their consumption and patterns to achieve the greatest
consumer welfare.
GRAPH 1
MugIrtal~ag cost
PcA ............ B Average total cost
C
Q, Quantity
Under perfect competition, competition will increase output until the price equals
the cost of producing the last unit (Q, = P, at intersection A). This competitive
paradigm must be augmented in capital-intensive situations where, due to economies
of scale and scope, marginal costs tend to decrease with each added unit. Thus,
except at the point where marginal costs (MC) equal average total costs (ATC), a
seeming disequilibrium occurs. If marginal cost is less than average total cost, the
carrier cannot recover its fixed investment and other "sunk" costs if rates equal
marginal costs (that is, the demand at price P, will not cover average total cost -
point B on Graph 1). That, in turn, will discourage additional investment.
Consequently, the economic ideal for capital intensive services is to set the price
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at the point where marginal costs and average total costs intersect (intersection C
on Graph 1). However, where significant scale economies exist, marginal costs and
average total cost-3 will not intersect:
GRAPH 2
6
I Quantity I
In the pipeline industry, the marginal cost of adding an additional unit once
shipments are at capacity may shoot the marginal cost line up beyond the average
total cost line as additional capacity can only be obtained by adding an additional
pipe (MC' and ATC').
The economically efficient solution - that is, the solution that minimizes the loss
of consumer surplus - is to allow the firm's prices to depart from marginal costs
in inverse relation to elasticity of demand - "Ramsey pricing."67 To be more
specific: If "monopoly" services are interspersed with more competitive (i.e., price-
elastic) services, the greatest efficiencies and lowest overall costs require markups
above the marginal costs inversely proportional to the elasticities of demand for the
several services. By marking up services inversely to service elasticities, the firm
66. Regulation seoks to increase output from Qm (monopoly output) to Qr (regulated output) even
though the economic ideal output is Qc (competitive output).
67. William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departuresfrom Marginal Costs Pricing, 60
AM. ECON. REv. 265 (1970); Pierce, supra note 49, at 676 ("Permitting Ramsey pricing by utilities with
large joint costs would enhance social welfare. Yet, because of some uncertain combination of ignorance,
equitable concerns, and political incentives, agencies implementing profit level regulation rarely permit
Ramsey pricing .... "); National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cf.
Meyer & Tye, supra note 33, at 281-86 (explaining Ramsey pricing and problems associated relative to
stand alone cost pricing).
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minimizes the consequential inefficient discouragement of consumption. Conversely,
when all rates for services are increased equally, efficient consumption is
discouraged, thereby unnecessarily shrinking consumer surplus to less than the
feasible optimum level.' The lawfulness of such differential pricing, particularly
in a regulated environment where some services are competitive, is well estab-
lished.'
As Judge Williams recently explained in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
ICC:
70
Ramsey pricing was designed for cases where marginal cost is below
average cost. Where that is true, a regulated firm forced to sell at
marginal cost cannot recoup its total costs. Under Ramsey pricing, the
regulator allows firms to charge each user a premium over marginal
cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of the user's demand.
Because the highest charges fall on the most inelastic demanders, the
impact on total usage is minimized. Thus, [Ramsey pricing] reconcile[s]
the railroad's need for revenue to cover total costs with the least
possible distortion of demand (i.e., railroad usage would approximate as
nearly as possible the level that would prevail under perfect competi-
tion).7'
C. The ICA's Provisions Accommodate Light-handed Regulation, Including Reli-
ance on Market Factors
The phrase "just and reasonable rates" has "no intrinsic meaning applicable alike
to all situations"' and, therefore, does not require "rigid" adherence to a "cost-
based determination of rates."' Over the years, courts have held that the joints of
the "just and reasonable" requirement are sufficiently flexible to accommodate rates
designed to provide non-cost incentives to carriers,74 to reflect the value of a
68. Although all pricing strategies that depart from marginal costs result in economic efficiency
losses, the magnitude of these losses differs, as does the impact on consumers' surplus. See Braeutigam,
Analysis, supra note 53.
69. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1444, 1454 (3d Cir. 1987)
(affirming ICC pricing plan "relyling] primarily on market forces, whereby services may be priced above
their attributable costs according to observable market demand .... "); Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC,
824 F.2d 981, 1010-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that judicial acceptance of price differentials is long
standing), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. United States, 606 F.2d
1131, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding rate determination in various proceedings just and reasonable), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
70. 985 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 596.
72. Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
73. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283,308 (1974); Alabama Great S. R.R. v. United States, 340
U.S. 216, 223 n.4 (1951) ("[T]his Court [has] consistently rejected any thought that costs should be the
controlling factor in rate making.").
74. See, e.g., In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 798 (1968) (approving two-tier
rate structure with higher rates designed to provide incentives to producers to explore for natural gas);
American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that an agency must
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service rather than its cost,"' to reflect competitive market factors,76 and to
advance non-cost goals such as ubiquitously affordable prices for service.' All of
these represent departures from the notion that rates must equal physical costs to be
just and reasonable.
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. United States,78 Judge Leventhal explained
why departures from "rates must equal costs" may be consistent with the statutory
standards that require just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates:
The Commission concluded that [the Interstate Commerce Act's] com-
mand permits some rates to be set at a level exceeding fully allocated
costs in order to compensate for those rates which must be set at less
than fully allocated costs to meet competition .... This was neither
arbitrary nor forbidden by the Act. It is pertinent to the objective of
providing an adequate overall level of earnings. If traffic with a high
value of service is viewed in isolation it bears a heavy burden. Yet all
shippers ultimately benefit when the rail carriers are able to generate
revenues needed for survival.'
Not only does the Commission have considerable discretion in defining what
constitutes a "just and reasonable" rate, it possesses still broader discretion in the
"choice of methods" of enforcing that requirement.'m The D.C. Circuit, in affirming
consider incentives in establishing just and reasonable rates), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978).
75. Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing that
"'value-of-service' ratemaking (i.e., rates varying on the basis of differing demand characteristics) has an
established place" in rate regulation).
76. See, e.g., Ccnsolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1444, 1454 (3d Cir. 1987)
(affirming ICC pricing plan "rely[ing] primarily on market forces); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
United States, 606 F.2d 1131, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that rates which exceed fully distributed
costs are "neither arbitrary nor forbidden by the Act"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
77. NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985). In
NARUC, the court rejected the notion that all rates must cover costs and provide no more than a
reasonable return. After noting that local charges do not cover the cost of local service and that heavy
toll users subsidize that deficiency, id. at 1104-05, the court rejected arguments that such a scheme was
contrary to the Act's just and reasonable standard, id. at 1111-15.
78. 606 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
79. Id. at 1148. History teaches that when railroads were caught in a similar squeeze, the result was
bankruptcy and deterioration in service. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:
Federalism and the R2ilroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1053 (1988). The lesson of the railroads is
that where a capital-intensive carrier has both "monopoly" and "competitive" services, regulation must
recognize that "rates under competition [are] a function of variable, [marginal] or operating costs, not of
fixed costs." Id. So long as the rates more than cover variable costs, no matter how little, the monopoly
ratepayer is better off because the excess over variable cost reduces fixed costs that would otherwise be
borne by the monopoly service. Id.
If the common costs are not covered, then the carrier becomes unprofitable and, eventually, cannot
attract the investment needed to meet its service obligations. Price-level regulation precludes (or at least
seriously inhibits) mo'ing to a rational price structure as a pipeline's services become more competitive.
The real problem of price-level regulation is not high rates for "monopoly" segments, but the potential
disintegration of the financial viability of pipelines faced with stiffer and stiffer competition.
80. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[T]he
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an ICC decision to detariff contract carrier services, pointed out that regulatory
agencies "'are neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future
within the inflexible limits of yesterday."'8
The notion that the Commission is affirmatively obliged to measure every rate
against a rigid "just and reasonable" standard is legally mistaken. The Act contem-
plates carrier-initiated rates, not a series of commission-prescribed just and
reasonable rates. The Commission can decide not to investigate any rates absent a
complaint.' Indeed, courts have affirmed agency decisions not to pursue a rate
investigation despite a preliminary determination that the carrier-initiated rate is
unlawful83 and to abandon an investigation after completing hearings on the
reasonableness of rates.' The "check" on the Commission is that a customer may
"require the Commission to investigate the lawfulness of any rate at any time -
and may secure judicial review of any decision not to" undertake an investigation.'
111. A Regulatory Paradigm - A Structure That Provides Correct Incentives and
Assures Just and Reasonable Rates
Competition constrains the prices a firm can charge for individual services,
thereby indirectly imposing an earnings constraint on the firm. The price-level
regulation plan outlined below is designed to do what the competitive market does
- restrain price increases, thereby constraining the firm's profits.
The plan contains three mechanisms to assure rates are just and reasonable, that
is, are like market-based rates. The first mechanism restrains each pipeline's
aggregate increases in prices to the increase in the prior year's Consumer Price
Index (CPI). The second mechanism allows percentage adjustments in individual
rates within specified limits. To further discipline individual rate adjustments, the
third feature of the plan is a spare capacity auction mechanism that will virtually
preclude monopoly pricing of those segments in which a pipeline might possess
significant market power.
Commission has broad discretion in selecting methods... to make and oversee rates.) (quoting
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (refusing to substitute court's
judgment for FCC's in selection of alternative in rate determination), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981)).
81. Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 757 F.2d 301, 320 n.118 (D.C. Cir.)
(quoting American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967)), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1019 (1985)); see also Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1157 (9th
Cir.) ("Regulatory practices and policies that will serve the 'public interest' today may be quite different
from those that were adequate to that purpose in 1910, 1927, or 1934 .. "), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836
(1975).
82. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444,454-55 (1979) (refusing
to judicially review commission's decision not to investigate absent complaint).
83. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. v. FERC, 832 F.2d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 868 (1988).
84. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 235, 238 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1961).
85. Southern Ry., 442 U.S. at 454; see also Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States,
757 F.2d 301, 323 (D.C. Cir.) (commenting on "commission's continuing authority to investigate and
suspend unlawful rates"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019 (1985).
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Restraining Overall Increases in Prices: A firm inevitably must increase prices
to cover cost increases. In competitive markets each firm has an incentive to hold
down its particular costs, thus permitting it to boost its profit margin compared to
its competitors. As each individual firm in a competitive market has that same
incentive, total costs as reflected in various inflation indices account for each
producer's improved efficiencies, that is, productivity gains.
Pipelines purchase their inputs of labor, capital, and materials in competitive
markets. Preliminary evidence being developed by the pipelines indicate that
pipeline productivity lags the economy as a whole. Thus, limiting increases to the
rise in a general cost index effectively imposes a productivity incentive on pipelines.
Three well-known, readily available indices measure changes in costs:8"
The Consumer Price Index (CPI), computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
measures changes in retail costs. The CPI is the most widely known index of output
price inflation in the U.S. economy and is available without a significant time lag.
The Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross National Product (GNP deflator)
represents changes in the prices of both consumer and capital goods, i.e., total
output in the U.S. economy. Historically, the GNP deflator and the CPI have grown
at virtually indistinguishable rates.
The Producer Price Index (PPI) does not measure the purchasing power of
money in general, but rather the prices of goods purchased by businesses.
Using the CPI appears to be more consistent with the price-level regulation than
alternative measures. The focus of price-level regulation is on how the prices of the
regulated services move with other prices, and the CPI accomplishes this objective.
The GNP deflator is not available as timely as the CPI. The PPI changes the focus
back to cost, which should be avoided, and does not make the break from current
cost-based regulation. As such, it is somewhat inconsistent and opens the door to
injecting other inappropriate cost measures.
Assuming a pipeline's current rates equal its current (opportunity) costs, then
those rates in the aggregate should increase in relation to the cost increases incurred
by pipelines generally. For example, if a pipeline's average rate is $1.00 and the
cost index advances 5%, the pipeline (everything being equal) would be entitled to
an average rate of $1.05.
Some costs changes, however, are not within the pipeline's control and are
exogenous to the CPI (or whatever index is selected)."8 Exogenous costs are costs
beyond a pipeline's control and are not the type of cost factored into the CPI
calculation or, if factored into the CPI, have a unique, disproportionate impact on
pipelines. Such cost changes include those due to changes in laws, regulations, or
rules or due to other administrative, legislative, or judicial rulings. Such exogenous
costs include, for example, changes in the tax laws or changes in depreciation rates
and environmental costs (i.e., cleanup costs). Thus, the price level must be adjusted
86. See PRIcE LivEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 50-51.
87. Of course none of these precisely measures the cost changes of a particular pipeline. See Joskow
& Schmalensee, supra note 38, at 33.
88. PRIcE LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 53-55.
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for such costs in order to assure that the price-level formula does not lead to
unreasonably high or unreasonably low rates.
Restraining Percentage Increases In Individual Rates: Within the overall
constraint, pipelines need the flexibility to adjust individual rates to reflect economic
realities. Assuming a particular pipeline faces more intense competition on some
segments of its system than on others, it might tend to hold prices on some
segments constant and recover the permitted overall increase (to the extent possible)
on less competitive segments. Within limits, that tendency approaches the correct
economic result.'
Where an overall price adjustment constraint exists, a potential for abuse may
exist if no restraint is placed on individual price adjustments. To make certain no
such abuse occurs, a restraint should be imposed on individual price changes.
Specifically, the maximum permitted adjustment in individual rates cannot be X%
more than the least adjusted rate. For example: If X% is 10% and the pipeline
elects not to adjust one rate or decreases even one rate, it cannot adjust any other
rate more than 10% - even if that means the new revenue level is less than the
permitted revenue level calculated in the first step. If the pipeline increases each
rate at least 2%, then it could adjust any other rate as much as 12% so long as it
did not exceed the overall revenue limitation.
Spare Capacity Auction Mechanism: To further assure competitive and competi-
tive-like pressures on rates, the plan requires pipelines to implement a "spare
capacity" service. That service envisions auctioning off spare capacity at a price that
is not less than the pipeline's short-term marginal costs.
The spare capacity rate will help discipline the pricing of the normal service rate.
At the same time, the availability of the spare capacity rate will promote the
efficient utilization of resources. It will capture business that equals or exceeds
marginal cost but is not attracted by the pipeline at the "normal" tariff rate. The
spare capacity rate benefits pipelines because they have the potential of recovering
and retaining additional net revenues (that is, gross revenues minus relevant costs).
A. A Formula for Calculating Each Pipeline's Overall Revenue Constraint
A pipeline faces two types of cost changes. The first are normal increases
occasioned by inflation and other general price-level changes. Those cost changes
are reflected in cost indices such as the CPI, GNP deflator, and PPI.9' The second
are exogenous cost changes, that is, changes not reflected in various inflation
89. The fundamental shortcoming of price-level regulation is the danger that the values for adjusting
price will be set at inappropriate levels. Where the figure chosen is excessively low, it will be the
pipeline that will suffer initially, but as always, in the long run the shipper will bear the cost. In this
case, the cost would result from inadequate investment and foregone innovation opportunities. All of
these add up to higher prices than otherwise would have prevailed. Excessively low price-level
adjustment factors probably pose the greater danger, both because there is no simple method for their
prevention and because their consequences can be so serious.
90. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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indices.' Both need to be taken into account in calculating an appropriate restraint
on a pipeline's right to adjust aggregate price levels.
The following formula sets out the relevant inputs for adjusting a pipeline's
revenues annually to reflect both normal cost measures and exogenous cost changes
as well as changes in demand.
-L~= Q 1 + t x JAP t 1 x ( c2it - + Exog)
RL/t = Revenue Level Index for current year
Qt.i = Prior year demand expressed in barrels of oil transported"
APt.1 = Prior year's weighted-average, permitted rate per barrel
(base year revenues/base year units)
CPIt = Consumer Price Index for current year
CPI..1 = Consumer Price Index for prior year
Exog = Value of exogenous adjustments as percentage of RLIt. 1
Once the formula is agreed to, the determination of the formula inputs is straightfor-
ward.
The Revenue Level Index (RLI) is the total revenues realized by the pipeline
from tariffed services. -The initial base year is the realized revenue in the year prior
to implementation of the price-level plan. RLIt reflects the total revenues allowed
in the current year and the maximum revenues that adjusted rates may yield in the
aggregate. Assume a pipeline has four tariffed rates:
Base Year
Rate Units Revenue
Rate A $ 5 20 $ 100
Rate B 10 20 200
Rate C 15 20 300
Rate D 20 20 400
80 $1000
In this example, the pipeline's base year would be $1000.
Now assume the pipeline realized one additional unit in each rate group, the CPI
advanced 5%, and exogenous adjustments were $10 or 1% of the base year reve-
nues. Using those assumptions, the pipeline would be permitted to adjust its rates
to realize $1113:
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. Changes in demand need to be reflected. See PRICE LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 55-
59; Pierce, supra note 49, at 674.
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(t CPItRLI= (Q-1 + AQt- 1) x x + Exog)
(80 +4) x 1000 ( 105  )
80 100
1113
In the next year, RLIt becomes the new base year. Thus, if the pipeline experi-
enced no changes in demand, the CPI increased 3%, and exogenous costs did not
change, the pipeline's allowed revenues (the new RLI ) would be $1146:
R!I t = (84 + 0) x 1113 x 108 +.0084 105
= 1146
After the first year, the adjusted revenues (RLIt) must be based on the prior
year's calculated RLIt not the realized revenue.' In a particular year, competitive
pressures may not allow a pipeline to increase its rates to achieve the permitted
revenue level. Over the long run, however, competitors' prices will tend to increase
at the same average rate as the CPI. Thus, the relevant factor needs to be the
calculated revenues, not realized revenues. Adjustments to the calculated RLIt need
to be made in two instances: (1) if a pipeline abandons a tariffed service or adds
a tariffed service, and (2) if the pipeline places a new pipeline or pipeline segment
in service.
If a pipeline segment is abandoned during the year, the units for the tariff(s)
covering that pipeline segment should be reflected at zero (that is, A Q for that rate
would reflect a 100% decrease in the prior year's units even though the pipeline
may have been abandoned in the last half of the year). As to new services, the
pipeline should be permitted to set the rate for a new service. Thereafter, the rate
and units would be incorporated into the formula after the rate has been in effect
for a full twelve-month period.
B. A Formula for Calculating the Restraints on Upward Adjustment in Individual
Tariffed Rates
After determining the permitted overall revenue adjustment, the plan envisions
restraints on the adjustments to individual prices to realize the additional revenue.
94. The pipeline, of course, may not wish to file tariffs annually or even within a several year
period. When it does file, the pipeline would simply update the RLI to the prior year to show the prior
year's calculated RLI.
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Essentially, the maximum that an individual rate can be adjusted is (a) X% if at
least one tariff rate is not adjusted or is decreased, or (b) X% more than the lowest
percentage increase of any rate if all the pipeline's tariff rates are increased. In the
next year, the maximum permitted increase would be X% - 1% if the rate had been
increased X% in the prior year. In the following year, the maximum permitted
increase would be X% - 2% if the rate had been increased X% + (X% - 1%) over
the prior two years. In no event would (a) the maximum permitted increase be less
than Y% plus the lowest percentage increase in a rate, or (b) would the annual in-
crease in any rate exceed X%.
Assume X% is 10%, Y% is 5%, and at least one rate was not increased. An
individual rate could not be increased more than 10% or the cumulative increases
exceed X t + (X% - l%t,) + (X% - 2 %t), etc. The maximum differentials would
be:
Annual Cumulative
Year 1 10% 10%
Year 2 9% 19%
Year 3 8% 27%
Year 4 7% 34%
Year 5 6% 40%
Year 6 5% 45%
Year 7 5% 50%
This permits the pipeline to transition toward an economically rational rate struc-
ture and, at the same time, to restrain monopoly pricing where pockets of market
power might edst.
Returning to the RLI example, again assume base year revenues of $1000, a one
unit increase in each rate category and the permitted increase is 6%. Further assume
that the pipeline concludes that it can increase Rate D only 2% for competitive rea-
sons. That means no other rate can be increased more than 12%. And, given the
limitations on the over increase only one rate could be increased as much as 12%.
Thus, within those constraints, a pipeline might adopt the following rate structure:
Adj. Base Year Permitted Increase Inc. with Revenue Restraint
Units R.ate Revenue % Inc. Rate Revenue % Inc. Rate Revenue
Rate A 21 $ 5 $105 12% 5.60 $ 117.60 12% 5.60 $ 117.60
Rate B 21 $10 210 12% 11.20 235.20 9.5% 10.95 $ 229.95
Rate C 21 $15 315 12% 16.80 352.80 7% 16.05 $ 337.05
Rate D 21 $20 410 2% 20.40 428.40 2% 20.40 S 428.40
$1050 $1134.00 $1113.00
If the inflation rate were 3% in the next year and Rate D were not increased, the
maximum permitted increase in the $5.60 rate would be 9% as it was increased the
maximum 10% te same year.
95. See supra pait III.A.
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Assume that the units remained the same except for Rate D which suffered a 2-
unit decrease; therefore, the pipeline decides not to increase the Rate D tariff. The
new revenue level would be $1119:
RLI, (Q-I + X AP (cPI +Exo)
84 + (-2)] x 1113 - (2 x 13.25) (108 +
82 105
- 1119
Given the restraints on price-level increases, the pipeline could not increase its
rates to yield the permitted revenue level of $1,119.' Specifically, if the pipeline
were to hold the Rate D tariff at $20.40, the price-level restraints (the 9% in Year
2 and the cumulative restraint) would preclude rate adjustments sufficient to yield
the permitted RLI.
Adj. Base Year Permitted Increase Inc. with Revenue Restraint
Units Rate Revenue % Inc. Rate Revenue % Inc. Rate Revenue
Rate A 21 $ 5.60 $ 117.60 9% 6.10 $ 128.10 9% 6.10 $ 128.10
Rate B 21 $10.95 229.95 10% 12.04 252.84 8.5% 11.88 $ 249.45
Rate C 21 $16.05 337.05 10% 17.65 370.65 5% 16.85 $ 353.85
Rate D 21 $20.40 387.60 10% 22.44 426.36 0% 20.40 $ 387.60
$1072.20 $1177.95 $1119.00
While the example is simplified, it illustrates the real world effect of how the
combination of revenue-level and price-level restraints will benefit consumers. In
terms of real dollars, consumers are no worse off if pipeline rates increase at the
same rate as the CPI. But, due to the combination of the revenue-level restraints,
pipeline rates in the aggregate are likely to lag the increases in the CPI, thus result-
ing in lower rates in real dollars.
C. A Formula for Determining the Spare Capacity (Auction) Rate
The airlines, when they were still subject to rate regulation, discovered that they
were better off filling an empty seat at a "discount" fare which exceeded their mar-
ginal costs than to fly with that seat empty. Regulated airline "discount" fares with
restrictions advanced economic efficiency in three ways. First, they tended to move
passengers with flexibility to off-peak travel times, thus relieving pressure on the
airline to purchase additional equipment to meet peak capacity demand. Second,
they attracted additional, profitable business by creating fare structures that were
economically efficient; that is, pricing the most elastic demand closer to marginal
96. In Year 1, the increase was 10% or 2% less than the permitted maximum. Thus, the 10%
maximum permitted increase in Year 2 would not exceed the cumulative maximum of 19%.
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costs. Third, they put pressure on all carriers to structure their rates in an economi-
cally rational way.
The same rationale applies to oil pipelines which, like the airlines, are capital-
intensive, cannot rapidly expand and contract capacity in small increments, and
often face seasonal fluctuations. Thus, a similar "discount" rate program under
price-level regulation will provide further assurance that the pipeline structures its
rates in an economically rational manner, even where it possesses some market
power.
The proposed spare capacity mechanism would work much along the lines as the
airline discount fare program. The pipeline's "average spare capacity" for each
month of the base year would be determined. The pipeline's average variable (mar-
ginal) per barrel costs for the base year for each tariff rate would be determined.
After the pipeline receives its tenders for M-month, it would auction off the remain-
ing capacity up to, the average spare capacity for the month as determined in the
first step.' The winning bid(s) would have to exceed the pipeline's average vari-
able (marginal) cost. A shipper electing to participate at the M-month's auction
could not later decide to ship the "bid barrels" at the tariff rates in M-month
Thus, if a shipper is not willing to tender the barrels at the full tariff rate, it as-
sumes the risk of participating at the auction.
In the following year (RLIt), the spare capacity subject to auction would be the
average of the RL1t_1 spare capacity (the actual spare capacity plus the spare capac-
ity purchased at auction) and the RLIt_2 spare capacity.
S~ .= _ + Sc- 2)
SCt  = spare capacity subject to auction in current year
SC.. 1 = spare capacity in prior year
SCt.2 = spare capacity two years earlier
The spare capacity mechanism provides additional incentives for the pipeline to
price its basic tariff rate at an economically efficient level. To the extent that the
pipeline deviates from efficient pricing, it provides shippers the incentive to take
their chances at the auction, thereby pressuring the "average" rate toward an eco-
nomically correct level.
The revenues generated under the spare capacity auctions would not be included
in the determination of the overall revenue constraint or individual price change
97. The bidding culd be done electronically, for example, by E-mail. The pipeline would "publish"
the space capacity electronically. Shippers would electronically submit their bids at a specific date and
time.
98. Also, affiliates of the pipeline would be precluded from participating in the auction.
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constraint. This exclusion will put additional pressure on the pipeline to structure
its fixed tariff rates in an economically rational manner. Using the previous exam-
ple, assume that after Rate A is increased to $5.60, one shipper decided to purchase
transportation at the auction. As a result, in Year 2 the pipeline ships only 15 units
at $5.60 (rather than the previous 21 units) and ships 6 units at $4.50 (the auction
price). Assume that the capacity is 26 units. The pipeline could increase its $5.60
rate in Year 3 by 9% to $6.10, but would it? In Year 3, the spare capacity subject
to auction will be 8 units (the average of the 5 spare capacity units in Year 1 and
the 11 units in Year 2). This leaves at least 18 units (26 capacity minus 8) which
must be sold at the tariff rate.
If the pipeline does not increase the units purchased under the tariff from 15 to
18, the capacity subject to auction will increase again in Year 4. The fact that more
and more capacity is subject to an auction price does two things. First, it signals
that the tariff rate probably requires adjustment. Second, it retards and eventually
eliminates the pipeline's ability to achieve supracompetitive profits on a particular
pipeline segment.
D. Proposed Considerations
The Interstate Commerce Act contemplates pipeline-initiated rates, not commis-
sion-prescribed rates. To protect consumers under this regime, the Act provides for
a thirty-day notice period during which the Commission undertakes a preliminary
evaluation of the rates to determine whether further investigation is warranted."
If the Commission decides that an investigation is warranted, it may suspend the
effective date of the rates for up to seven months."°
The light-handed regulation proposal is built around the Act's notice-and-suspen-
sion structure. The plan contemplates that rate changes within the guidelines will
not be suspended and that they are presumptively reasonable.
Rate adjustments which exceed the guidelines may be filed, but normally would
be suspended for the full statutory period and investigated.' Consistent with the
Commission's discretionary suspension power, the guidelines establish "a tentative
opinion about the location of the line between the just and the unjust, the reasonable
and unreasonable."'" The courts have laided such an approach as "an intelligent
and practical exercise of [the Commission's] suspension power .... "
For filings within the guidelines, the only supporting data required of a pipeline
would be a printout showing that the revised tariff rates comply with the revenue
restraints and pricing restraints. No cost of service or "top sheets" would be neces-
sary or required.0 '
99. 49 U.S.C. § 6(3) (1959).
100. ILa § 15(7).
101. Under this regime, a rate filing that exceeds the guidelines is not protected, and normally would
be suspended.
102. In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 653 (1978).
103. Id.
104. In Advanced Micro Devices v. CAB, 742 F.2d 1520, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court upheld
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) tariff filing and review procedures akin to those proposed here. The
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For a filing outside the guidelines, the pipeline would be required to file cost-of-
service data (including its direct case). If the pipeline were seeking revenues in
excess of the guidelines it would have to demonstrate that rates within the guide-
lines would be confiscatory, that is, unjustly and unreasonably jow.0 3 If the pipe-
line were seeking to adjust an individual rate outside the guidelines, but still remain
within the overall revenue restraint, it would be required to submit evidence justify-
ing that departure,"'
IV. Procedures Governing Implementation of Price-Level Regulation
The Commissicn should implement price-level regulation using each pipeline's
existing rates. This is consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 which deems
existing, unchallenged rates just and reasonable."° The present reasonableness of
the rates may be challenged only upon a showing of changed circumstances."'
On a going forward basis, the Commission must establish standards for judging
the reasonableness of individual rates in complaint cases. If the Commission decides
to substitute price-level regulation for cost-of-service regulation, the beneficial
incentives will be lost if the Commission entertains complaints alleging that a rate
within the price-level guidelines yields an excessive return level. If the Commission
finds that such ccmplaints state a cause of action, price-level regulation will not
have replaced cost-of-service regulation, but merely encrusted another layer of regu-
lation upon it.
To assure that the benefits of price-level regulation come to fruition, the Commis-
sion needs to specify the criteria for setting out a prima facie case in a complaint.
Obviously, the Commission should entertain complaints that allege rates are unlaw-
fully discriminatory.'" Again, differential pricing reflecting correct economic fac-
tors would not be deemed unlawful discrimination."'
CAB in Advanced Micro Devices created a no-suspension zone for international cargo tariff filings. Id.
at 1524-25. The CAB rules eliminated the requirement that carriers file cost data to justify rates within
the zone, and placed upon rate opponents the burden of demonstrating "extraordinary circumstances" for
suspending within-zone filings. Id. at 1533-36. The court determined that these rules were reasonable,
and consistent with th.- CAB's statutory obligation to ensure just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates.
Id. at 1531-37.
105. The Interstate Commerce Acts just and reasonable standard "coincides with that of the
constitution." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); In re Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968).
106. The two most likely reasons for proposing rate increases that exceed the pricing guidelines are:
(1) the increase is necessary to cover the cost of providing the service, and (2) the adjustment is
necessary in light of adjustments to other rates to maintain proper rate relationships. See American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 495 F.2d 1010, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("That the reasonableness of a rate may turn
in part on its relationship to other rates is a principle which has 'long been settled."') (quoting United
States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490, 500 (1933)). Data unrelated to the reason advanced for the
increase would not be required because it would simply clutter the process and unnecessarily take up
valuable staff resources - all for no purpose.
107. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 1803(a), 106 Stat. at 3011.
108. Id. § 1803(b), 106 Stat. at 3011.
109. 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1959).
110. See supra p:irt II.C. In economic terms, the necessity of differential pricing for oil pipelines
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As to unjust and unreasonable rates, a complaint which simply alleges that a
particular rate produces an excessive return on rate base or that a company's overall
return is excessive would fail to state a cause of action. A contrary rule would
undermine all the benefits of price-level regulation as carriers would still be subject
to "rate base/rate of return" regulation via the complaint process. To show a rate
was unreasonable, a complainant would have to allege and provide evidence that the
rate exceeded stand-alone costs.' or was less than marginal costs. Those are the
relevant economic standards, and the tests that will allow pipeline rates to move to
market levels.
Conclusion
The debate needs to move away from whether or not pipelines are sufficiently
competitive to be deregulated. Deregulation is unrealistic given the number of
politically powerful skeptics. The FERC's "solution" is light-handed regulation -
still an ambiguous concept - doled out on a case-by-case basis after interminably
long proceedings costing millions of dollars. The next best solution and the one that
appears realistic, is a price-level regulation regime which unlinks costs and profits
from permitted price levels. The FERC has signalled the right objective: In return
for greater pricing flexibility, the rate paid by shippers should (in the aggregate) be
less than what they could expect to pay under traditional cost-of-service regulation.
At the same time, pipelines face potential costs to satisfy environmental and safety
regulations which may be disproportionate to other industries. Thus, the Commis-
sion cannot expect that pipeline rates will simply stay at about the same level in real
dollars.
is straightforward. The marginal cost of oil pipeline service is less than the average cost, because the
fixed plant is used in a progressively more efficient manner. The differential between marginal costs and
average costs cannot be assigned directly to specific movements. These unattributable costs are the costs
which must be covered through differential pricing, as any means of allocating these costs among
shippers other than actual market demand is arbitrary and may not permit the pipeline to cover all of its
costs. This is because non-demand-based cost apportionment methods do not necessarily reflect the
pipeline's ability (or inability) to impose the assigned allocations and cover its costs. Thus, arbitrary
allocation methods frequently "overassign" or "underassign" the pipelines unattributable costs to
particular services.
111. On the high side, stand-alone costs are the correct measure of unreasonableness. See PRICE
LEVEL REGULATION, supra note 33, at 19-25,47; Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide (Exparte No. 347),
1 I.C.C.2d 520, 549 (1985) (adopting "constrained market pricing" for determining reasonableness of rail
competitive coal rates), affd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1444 (3d Cir.
1987).
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